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While tests of producer rationality defined as conformity  to the rules of profit maximization
(or  a similar  postulate)  for  less developed  countries  are numerous,  such tests  for  high-income
countries  are rare.  This  study  investigates  the extent of  rationality  observed  in the production
behavior  of ranchers  in southeastern  Montana.  The procedure  used  is that of Wise,  Yotopoulos,
and  Nugent,  based  on  a  profit-maximizing  production  model.  The  data  were  collected  by
personal  interviews  for  69  ranchers.  Results  indicate  that  profit  maximization  is a  reasonably
good  postulate for  studying the  behavior  of ranchers,  and  that  various  policy measures  could,
at least tentatively,  proceed  on that basis.
Investigation  of  producer  efficiency  or
rationality  is  important  for  the  under-
standing of supply behavior.  It enables one
to judge how closely  the producer  behav-
ior  conforms  to  the  optimality  rules  of
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standard  economic  theory.  Thus, one can
get a feel for the validity  of prevalent be-
liefs  concerning  the  irrational  or  unre-
sponsive character of some of the econom-
ic  agents on the supply  side.
It has now become commonplace to find
assessments  of rationality in  studies of de-
cision  makers  in  less-developed  country
(LDC) settings. Largely as a result of many
such  assessments,  particularly  in  agricul-
ture, the notion that suppliers in LDCs are
irrational,  inefficient,  or  unresponsive  to
economic  incentives  seems  to  have  been
greatly  deemphasized.  In fact, partly bas-
ing his  judgment  on  such studies,  T.  W.
Schultz  stated  in  his  Nobel  Lecture  "...
farmers  the  world  over  in  dealing  with
costs, returns and risks are calculating eco-
nomic agents.  Within their small, individ-
ual,  allocative  domain  they  are fine-tun-
ing  entrepreneurs,  tuning  so  subtly  that
many experts  fail to  realize  how  efficient
they are."
Suggestions  that  some  groups  of  pro-
ducers  even  in  high-income,  developed
countries, are not  "rational"  are not lack-
ing. For example,  J. Schultz remarked thatA  Test of Economic Rationality
economists  feel  ranchers,  ". . . when con-
trasted  to  more  progressive  agricultural-
ists, seem to make irrational economic de-
cisions  and  continue  to  employ
economically  unproductive  managerial
strategies."  Although suggestions that pro-
ducers  in  some  sectors  of  even  high-in-
come  economies  may be irrational,  in the
sense  of  not being  profit  maximizers,  are
not  lacking,  and  although  the  issue  is  at
least  as  important  in  the  high-income
countries  as  in  the  LDCs,  systematic  as-
sessments  of  such  claims  relative  to  the
high-income  countries  seem  rare.  In  one
of the few  studies in  this area,  Smith and
Martin  tended  to  conclude  that  a  postu-
late  of  profit  maximization  as  the  major
goal  of livestock  producers in the western
United  States  would  probably  be  unreal-
istic,  and  that  the  business  attitudes  and
goals of Arizona ranchers studied by them
tended to be influenced  also by what they
called  "family  fundamentalism,"  "con-
spicuous  consumption,"  and  "local  social
satisficing."  In another study, based on  six
large California farms, Lin et al. conclud-
ed  that  Bernoullian  and  Lexicographic
utility  functions  explained  these  farmers'
behavior better than the postulate of prof-
it maximization.'
The  main  objective  of this  study  is  to
investigate directly the question of wheth-
er  the  behavior  of  livestock  ranchers  in
southeastern  Montana  conforms  to  the
standard producer optimality rules and, in
particular,  whether profit maximization  is
a  reasonable  postulate  for  their  produc-
tion  behavior.2  As  a  secondary  matter,
That does  not, of course, mean  that the farmers are
"irrational"  in any significant  sense; only that prof-
it-maximization  is not  as good  a postulate  for their
objective  functions as  the postulate of maximization
of certain  types  of utility  functions.
2 As  footnote  1 indicates,  it  is  not  our  position  that
the  goal  of profit-maximization  is the only  or even
the most plausible  sign of producer  rationality.  Many
other,  perhaps  equally  plausible,  goals  of  rational
producers have been suggested.  These  include some
kind of  a "satisficing"  principle  suggested  by Her-
bert  Simon  (1978)  and others,  the X-efficiency  ap-
regression estimates are used to judge elas-
ticities  of supply  of capital  and  labor.  As
explained  above,  such an investigation  of
the  degree  of producer  rationality  seems
useful  since,  despite  several  suggestions
that  ranchers  in the  western  U.S.  might
not  be  profit  maximizers  and  might  not
be "rational" decision makers in this sense,
there are very few studies that throw light
on  the  issue.  Aside  from  any  conceptual
insight  that  such  an  investigation  may
provide,  as a practical matter, it is perhaps
important  to  know  whether  livestock
ranchers  make  marginal  calculations  and
are willing  to  use their  resources  so  as  to
maximize returns, or whether they are un-
responsive  to marginal  changes,  ignorant
of the possibilities of technological change,
and primarily  want to raise  cattle the tra-
ditional way and maintain their lifestyles.
Communications  would  be  improved
among  all facets  of the livestock industry
if conservationists  working  for land  man-
agement  agencies,  range  scientists,  and
policy  makers  acquire  a  little better  un-
derstanding  of the economic  strategies  of
ranchers.
Unlike  the  usual  procedures  based  on
constant-parameter  production  relations,
we compute and assess a rationality index
that is derived from a multiequation mod-
el of supply in which (a) input and output
prices are permitted to vary across  firms,
and  (b) a firm-specific technical efficiency
parameter  is  introduced,  thus  imparting
to the  study  a  greater  degree  of realism
and relevance.  While the framework  used
does  have some  weaknesses,  it seems bet-
ter  than  the  more  conventional  proce-
dures.
Section  II  states  the  methodology  and
proach  of Harvey  Leibenstein  restated  by  him re-
cently  and (subject to some target  profit constraint)
maximization  of sales  or rate of growth  of the firm
or  of  the  firm  size  (e.g.,  De  Alessi).  Our  general
position  is that rationality  is certainly consistent  with
a  variety  of  behavioral  postulates;  profit-maximi-
zation  seems  to  be  a  reasonable  enough  approxi-
mation to the  behavior  of rational  producers.
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describes  the data set used; section III dis-
cusses  the  main  results;  and  section  IV
contains  a few summarizing  and conclud-
ing remarks.
II. The Model,  Methodology,  and
the Data
For  the  main  purpose  of  the  study,
namely,  to assess the extent to which  pro-
duction  behavior  of  Montana  ranchers
could  be  regarded  as  consistent  with  the
goal of profit maximization, we utilize the
index of producer  rationality proposed  by
Wise  and  Yotopoulos  (1969a)  and  Yoto-
poulos  and  Nugent.  Since  their  frame-
work is  adopted by us with only  minimal
modifications,  we  shall state  the  method-
ology in  its barest  outline, and the reader
is referred  to the authors cited, especially
Yotopoulos  and  Nugent  (pp.  87-94)  for
details.  The  Wise-Yotopoulos-Nugent  in-
dex of producer rationality  is grounded in
a rather  neat  model of  supply.  Since  we
compute the  rationality  index  for  several
ranch  size groups  as  well as  provide  esti-
mates of  three  equations from  which  in-
put  supply  estimates  can  be  derived,  we
shall first  state  the  main model  and then
give the formulation for the rationality in-
dex.
Postulating  a  Cobb-Douglas  type  pro-
duction function, writing constant-elastic-
ity labor, capital supply,  product demand
functions,  and  using  the  profit  maximi-
zation rules along with the introduction of
firm-specific  technology  parameter  and
error components  in the  use of labor and
capital inputs and the choice  of output, a
set  of three  equations  is  obtained  in  the
major  observables,  namely,  labor  input
(Li),  capital  input  (Ki),  and total revenue
(Y).
The  final  estimating  equations  are  of
the form: 3
In  Y,  -v i =  a+  1  +  +  (In  Ki - Ui)  (1)
3 These  are  adapted,  with  only  minor  notational
modification,  from  Yotopoulos  and Nugent  (p.  92).
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and
In Ki  - U,  = d +  (  -(In  L  - U2 )  (3)
where In  stands for the natural logarithm
of the variable,  n7  and e are the supply elas-
ticities of capital and labor, v's and U's are
random error terms (possessing certain as-
sumed  properties),  and  a,  b,  and  d  are
constants.  Estimation of  (1)  and (2) would
yield  elasticities  of supply  of capital  and
labor,  respectively,  and  estimation  of  (3)
would  yield  an  estimate  of  the  ratio
(1  +  1/)  which  can be  used to check  in-
ternal  consistency  of  the  estimates  ob-
tained  from  (3)  with  those  from  (1)  and
(2).
Although  it  might seem  that equations
(1)-(3) constitute a system of simultaneous
equations,  since  each  has  an  endogenous
variable  on  the  right  side,  actually  these
can  be  regarded  as  semireduced  form
equations as they are reformulations  of the
three reduced form relations in which each
endogenous  variable  (Li,  Ki,  Yi)  is  ex-
pressed  in  terms  of  the  exogenous  term
(As).  At any rate, since estimation of 7r  and
e  is  not the focus  of the study,  we  do not
use any  of the conventional  simultaneous
equation  methods  to  estimate  these  pa-
rameters.  However,  as  Yotopoulos  and
Nugent  explain,  because  of  the  structure
of  the  error  terms,  the  equations  cannot
be consistently estimated by the use of the
ordinary  least-squares  method  (OLS).  As
should be evident, the problem  can be re-
garded  as  one  of  errors-in-variables,  and
a procedure  appropriate  to that situation
is  needed.  While  there  are  several  ap-
proaches  to  handling  the  errors-in-vari-
ables  problem,  we  follow  the  method
adopted  by  Wise-Yotopoulos-Nugent,
namely, the use of diagonal regression  es-
timates. Besides others, C. E. V. Leser (pp.
22-24)  and  Peter  Kennedy  (pp.  95-96)
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explain  the nature of the diagonal  regres-
sion  procedure.  Broadly  speaking,  the
method minimizes the sum of the squares
of  the  shortest  distances  between  the
regression  plane  and the  observations  af-
ter  the  variables  have  been  standardized
to have the same variance.  The method is
appropriate  in those cases where the ratio
of  the  variances  of  the  errors  in  the  de-
pendent  and  the  independent  variables
equals the ratio of the variances of the two
variables  themselves  (which is  the condi-
tion  the  authors  of  the  model  assume  to
hold).  In  the two-variable  case,  the diag-
onal  regression  estimator  (/)d)  is  given  by
Leser, (p. 24) to be /d = +[(variance  of the
dependent  variable)/(variance  of  the  in-
dependent  variable)]1 2 and  the  estimator
takes the  sign  of  the covariance  between
the two  variables.  It is  easy  to  show  that
fd =  'i2/P 12, where  /12  is the OLS estimator
and  P12  is  the  correlation  coefficient  be-
tween  the  two  variables.  The  above
expression  will  be  used  to obtain  the di-
agonal  regression  estimates from  OLS es-
timates.
The  index  of  rationality  (i.e.,  an  indi-
cator of the extent to which producers are
motivated  by  profit  maximization)  is  de-
rived  in  the  Wise-Yotopoulos-Nugent
framework from their supply model along
with a few further assumptions  about the
structure  of  the  error  terms.  It has  been
shown by  them that the rationality  index
(P) is simply the correlation coefficient be-
tween  the  natural  logarithms  of  the  ob-
served labor and capital inputs  across the
sample  firms. Although we  will avoid the
details  of  the  underlying  reasoning,  the
broad  logic  is,  as equation  (3)  shows,  that
the  model  implies  a  linear  relation  be-
tween  the  natural  logarithms  of the  true
(i.e., profit maximizing) inputs of labor and
capital (and as equations (1) and (2) show,
between the logarithms  of each  of the in-
puts and the total revenue).  Therefore,  if
each  producer  used  exactly  the  profit
maximizing quantities  of  labor and  capi-
tal, the correlation  between  the observed
quantities  of  (logarithms  of)  the  two in-
puts would be perfect. On the other hand,
if the  actual  input  usage  is  entirely  ran-
dom  and  there  is  no  systematic  (profit
maximizing)  component,  the  correlation
coefficient between the (logarithms of) ob-
served  quantities  of  labor  and  capital  is
expected  to be  zero.  The larger  the rela-
tive  size  of  the  profit-maximizing  com-
ponent in the actual input  use,  the closer
to unity  would  be  the  correlation  coeffi-
cient between  the logarithms  of observed
usage of labor and capital. The smaller the
relative  size of  such a systematic  compo-
nent, the closer the correlation  coefficient
would  be  to  zero.  Thus,  the  size  of  the
correlation  coefficient  between  the  loga-
rithms of the observed inputs  of labor and
capital can be treated  as the index  of pro-
ducer  rationality  in the sense  mentioned.
Making the normality assumption, one can
even test  the hypothesis  of no  rationality
(P = 0)  at any  preassigned level of signif-
icance.
It might be noted that we do not claim
that the Wise-Yotopoulos-Nugent  index of
rationality  is  flawless.  As  the  exchanges
between  Wise  and  Yotopoulos  (1968,
1969b,  1969c)  and  Paul  Johnson  (1968,
1969)  show,  a high or  perfect  correlation
between  the  (natural  logarithms  of)  ob-
served labor and capital usage can  indeed
be  consistent  with postulates quite differ-
ent from that of profit maximization.4 Also,
while  one can  find  a  formal  test  statistic
for  the  hypothesis  of  no  rationality  (P =
0),  it  is  not  as  easy  to test  rigorously  the
hypothesis  of  perfect  rationality  (P =  1). 5
4 An appropriate  test statistic  for Ho:  P = 0 would be
(PX/n-  2/1  V/P 2)  ~  tn_2  where  P  is  the  sample
value  of P and  n  is  the sample  size.  However,  the
test statistic  for  the null hypothesis  that  the "true"
P  is 1 is not  obvious.
5  Johnson (1968)  argues that a high value of P is quite
consistent  with the  postulate  of fixed input  propor-
tion,  independently  of profit-maximization.  Of
course, that would be the case if output varies across
the  firms.  Another  possibility  was  indicated  in  an
extremely  perceptive  comment  of  an  anonymous
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Figure  1.  Ranchers Residing  in Six  Counties  in Southeastern  Montana  Were  Personally  In-
terviewed.
Even with the test of no rationality,  there
may  be  problems  with  the  power  of  the
test.  In  that  spirit,  therefore,  we  would
regard the value of  P as a broad indicator
of  the  extent  to  which  the  observed  be-
havior  is  consistent  with  profit  maximi-
zation.  A  high  value  of  P  would  suggest
greater  conformity of the data  to the hy-
pothesis  of  rationality  (profit  maximiza-
tion),  and  a  low  P  value  would  indicate
that  profit  maximization  may  not  be  a
good  postulate for the sample farms.  One
cannot really speak meaningfully  about a
rigorous test  of rationality.6
It also  might be noted that Herbert  Si-
mon  (1979)  and  others  have  argued  that
estimation  of  neoclassical  production  re-
lations of the Cobb-Douglas  type basically
referee.  Suppose  that  firms  do  not  produce  profit
maximizing  output  although,  given  a  level  of out-
put, they minimize the cost of production.  It  is pos-
sible that all firms are on the (linear) expansion  path.
Thus  P  may  be  very high  even though  profits  are
not maximized  by assumption.
6 The  insightful  suggestions  of  the  co-editor  and  an
anonymous  reviewer  helped us much on  this point.
involves  verification  of  an  identity,  and
production  function  estimates  simply  re-
flect  such  an  accounting  identity.  How-
ever,  if the  production  function  exhibits
constant  returns  to scale,  the value of the
output would also approximate the sum of
the values of the inputs.  We do not go into
these  issues here.  One can find  arguments
on  both sides.  At any  rate, estimating the
production functions is not the core of our
work; the rationality index  can be  simply
computed  independently  of  the  estima-
tion  of the  production  parameters  and  is
not directly  dependent  on the interpreta-
tion of estimates  of these parameters.
The data were collected  during person-
al  interviews  with  69  ranchers  in  south-
eastern Montana  (Figure  1).  These ranch-
ers consented to be interviewed  when they
responded  to  a  questionnaire  that  was
mailed  to  830  ranchers  in  this  region.
Livestock  was  the  most  important  agri-
cultural  product in this region (75 percent
of the ranchers reported that they earned
75  percent  or more  of their  income  from
the sale of livestock or livestock products).
However,  61  percent  of the ranchers  did
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derive  some  income  from  the  sale  of
wheat,  hay, or other crops.
Output  (Y) was defined  as  the value  of
a ranch's gross agricultural  production for
the year  1979,  expressed  in dollars.  It in-
cludes  receipts  from  sale  of  livestock,
wheat, barley, hay, and alfalfa  seed. It ex-
cludes  the  value  of  seed  and  grain  pro-
duced and  retained  on the  ranch  for use
as  seed or livestock  feed.
Land  was treated  as  a  fixed input  that
cannot  be changed  during  the  short-run
planning  period.  Therefore,  the  land  in-
put  was  lumped  with  other  fixed  inputs
that  enter  the  exogenous  efficiency  pa-
rameter and vary between  ranches.  How-
ever,  acreage  was  related  to  the number
of  animal  units  (A.U.)  that  each  ranch
supports,  and  A.U.s  were  used  to  divide
the sample into  three groups  (small-50-
200;  medium-201-400;  and  large-401
or  more  animal  units).  Buildings  were
treated as part of capital stock rather than
as  land  investment  because  the  invest-
ment  in  buildings  was  closely  related  to
the amount of farm machinery.  Thus, they
reflected  land-use,  rather  than  the inher-
ent potential of the fixed  resources.
Labor  (L)  was  expressed  in  homoge-
neous  man-months.  Because  it  was  very
difficult for ranchers to estimate the num-
ber of hours they actually  worked,  it was
assumed  that  every  adult  male  worked
twelve  months.  If  an  adult  male  had  an
off-ranch  job,  his  man-months  of  labor
were reduced proportionately.  High school
age  boys  were  considered  to  work  four
man-months  during the year.  Although  a
wife's contribution  to the  labor  pool  was
variable (from several man-months of field
work  to  record  keeping  to  running  er-
rands  for equipment  repairs),  it  was  dif-
ficult  to  quantify because  some  ranchers
tended  to  exaggerate  (and  others  to  un-
derestimate)  the  contribution.  For  this
reason it was decided not to include wives
in  the labor  pool.  This  omission  probably
contributes  to the environmental  noise  in
the model.
Measurement  and aggregation  of "cap-
ital"  stock  includes  value  of  the  ranch's
structures  (buildings,  fences,  reservoirs,
wells, corrals, and all living residences  ex-
cept  for  one  residence  occupied  by  the
owner), equipment, and livestock,  plus the
ranch's  annual  maintenance  and operat-
ing  costs  (excluding the  cost of  hired  la-
bor).  The  estimated  flow  of  capital  (K)
represents  the annual  rent  (11  percent  of
1979  dollar  value) that  a ranch  would  be
paying if it had rented rather than owned
the services of capital assets.  The method
for imputing the rental value  is obviously
not quite satisfactory.  However, data lim-
itations seem to allow no other alternative.
Some  caution,  therefore,  is  needed  when
interpreting the results.  It is clear that the
capital supply function  used in the model
is  more flexible than the method  adopted
for imputing the rental on the capital; the
latter is a special case of the former.  Table
1 gives the means and standard deviations
of input and output by ranch  size.
III. Empirical Results
Table  2  summarizes  the  statistical  re-
sults. 7First, estimates for equations  (1),  (2),
and  (3) of Section II are reported.  Regres-
sions are fitted for each of the three ranch
sizes as well as for the full sample. Results
from the ordinary least-squares (OLS) and
from the diagonal regressions (DR) are re-
ported.  OLS  regression  estimates  are  re-
ported to  show  how  DR  results were  cal-
culated  from  OLS.  For each  of  the  four
samples, the implied supply elasticities for
capital  (x1)  and labor  (E)  are  reported.  Es-
timates of  P are given in each case for an
assessment of the degree of rationality, i.e.,
the  extent  of  conformity  to the  rules  of
profit maximization.
In regard to the elasticities  of supply of
capital and labor, note that an estimate of
1 for  (1  +  - or (  +  implies 77  (or  )
7 The  format of  the table  is adopted  from  Wise and
Yotopoulos  (1969a)  and  Yotopoulos and  Nugent.
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TABLE  1.  Descriptive Statistics.a
All Ranches  Small  Ranches  Medium  Ranches  Large  Ranches
Standard  Standard  Standard  Standard
Mean  Deviation  Mean  Deviation  Mean  Deviation  Mean  Deviation
No. of Observ.  - 69  - 18  - 21  - 30
Capital  ($)  114,221  86,254  44,217  17,206  82,300  28,006  178,569  93,099
Labor (man-mos.)  24.4  13.1  14.6  5.9  20.9  8.5  32.8  13.9
Land (acres)  15,746  13,962  4,355  1,596  10,365  3,983  26,349  15,061
Production ($)  129,487  99,125  51,159  27,831  95,787  46,250  200,073  106,423
a The data were collected by one of the authors by an  interview questionnaire.
TABLE 2.  Regression Statistics, Estimates  of the Elasticity of Supply of Capital  (t) and Labor
(E)  and  Estimates  of the  Index of Profit Maximization  (P)  for 69 Ranches  in  South-
eastern  Montana.
Coefficients and Standard Errors**
All Ranches  Small Ranches  Medium  Ranches  Large  Ranches
(n = 69)  (n = 18)  (n = 21)  (n = 30)
Least  Least  Least
Squares  Diagonal  Squares  Diagonal  Squares Diagonal
Regression  Quantity  Regres-  Regres-  Regres-  Regres-  Regres-  Regres-
Number  and  Being  sion  sion  sion  sion  sion  sion
Description  Estimated  (OLS)  (DR)*  (OLS)  (DR)*  (OLS)  (DR)*  (LS)  (DR)*
(R1)
Log Output on  [1  + (1/7)]  1.003  1.065  1.121  1.272  1.314  1.46  .850  1.002
Log Capital  (.0436)  (.0491)  (.1505)  (.1940)  (.1477)  (.1831)  (.1000)  (.1388)
(R2)
Log  Output on  [1  + (1/E)]  1.174  1.453  .867  1.378  .893  1.210  .7079  1.165
Log Labor  (.1045)  (.1600)  (.2681)  (.6778)  (.1881)  (.3464)  (.1749)  (.4739)
(R3)
Log Capital on  1 + (1/e)  1.1704  1.461  .7734  1.082  .680  .829  .8324  1.1627
Log Labor  1 + (1/n)  (.0999)  (.1558)  (.2178)  (.6156)  (.1382)  (.2934)  (.1716)  (.4392)
15.38  3.68  2.2  500.00
cE  ~2.21  12.19  4.8  6.1
P  .80  .60  .69  .63
Notes:  The estimating equations  are (1)-(3)  in the text.
V is total output in dollars.
K is treated  as capital.
L is labor months.
r  is the elasticity of supply of K.
e is the elasticity of supply of  L.
P is the index of economic rationality.
"In" before a variable indicates natural  logarithm of that variable.
* Estimated  by  using  the  property  3 12 = P12 (U 1/U 2). Since  the  diagonal coefficient  is  0a/L'2  sign  r 12, it  can  be
estimated by 0 12/P 12-
**  These are first approximations of the standard errors obtained  by assuming that var (b/r) = (var b)/r2.
P = proportion  of the  variance  of  the  log  in both  inputs  that  is due  to  variation  in the  systematic  profit
maximizing  component  of the  inputs,  that is  P =  (var X 1*/var  x 1 = (var X 2*/var x2). It  is  estimated  by the
product moment  correlation coefficient between  log capital and log labor.
is  infinite  and  thus  the  input  market  is
perfectly  competitive.  A  formal  test  of
the  hypothesis  H:  (1  +  )=1  and  Ho:
\  7 
7 ?
1  +-)=  1 is  rejected  (at the  5  percent
level)  for labor in full sample and for cap-
ital  in  the  case  of  medium  size  ranches.
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Therefore, there is something to be gained
by  letting  the  input  prices  vary  across
ranches.
In  regard  to the  degree  of  rationality,
in  the  sense  of  conformity  to  the  profit
maximization  rules, the  last row in  Table
2 giving the value of "P"  for various  sam-
ples,  is relevant.  As the simple correlation
coefficient  between  In  L  and  In  K,  P  is
bound by 0 and  1, with the latter  reflect-
ing  perfect  profit  maximization  and  the
former  reflecting  the  situation  in  which
little of  the  variance  in  the  logarithms  of
labor and capital inputs  is due  to system-
atic  input changes  associated  with  profit
maximization.  For the full sample, the in-
dex  of  rationality  is  0.80,  which  suggests
that the firms are fairly close to the profit
maximizing  levels of labor and capital in-
puts.  Note  that some  deviation  in  P from
the  perfect  value  of  1  would  be  due  to
stochastic reasons like measurement  errors
and environmental  "noise"  and would not
reflect  a  systematic  deviation  on the part
of  the  ranchers  from  the  profit  maximi-
zation  rules.  Hence,  as  Yotopoulos  and
Nugent  (p.  91)  also  mention, the estimat-
ed  value  of  P  could  be  regarded  as  an
indicator  of the  lower  bound  on  the  de-
gree of rationality  of the sample  ranches.
The values  of  P for the  three subsamples
are 0.60, 0.69 and 0.63 for small, medium
and large ranches, respectively.  These val-
ues,  although  somewhat  lower  than  that
for the entire group, are quite high.  Thus,
it  seems  reasonable  to infer  that  ranches
in  all  size  groups  operate  fairly  close  to
the profit  maximizing  rules.  Of course,  as
stated  in  the  last section,  the  values  of  P
should be regarded as broad indicators and
not as parameter  estimates  amenable to a
sharp test of rationality  or profit maximi-
zation. At least, perhaps, one could say the
results  are  not  inconsistent  with  a  postu-
late of profit  maximization.
A  few  words  by  way  of comparison  of
the results of this study with those report-
ed by Yotopoulos and Nugent  (p.  94) may
be  useful.  Although the degree  of ration-
ality  revealed  in  the  two  settings  (which
are obviously very different)  is similar, two
differences  appear  striking.  First,  the  in-
put supply elasticity  estimates obtained in
this study  are all positive  and, thus,  quite
credible as opposed to the negative supply
elasticity  estimates  reported  by  Yotopou-
los  and  Nugent  in three  of  the  six  cases.
Second,  there  is  much  greater  internal
consistency  in our estimates  than in those
reported  by  Yotopoulos  and Nugent.  For
example,  their  estimate  of the  expression
(1 +  1/7) obtained  by taking  the ratio  of
(1  +  1/c)
the  coefficients  of  In  K  and  In  L  in  the
first two  equations  seems to differ greatly
from the direct estimate for the expression
obtained  from the  third  equation.  In our
case,  the  "direct"  and  the  "indirect"  es-
timates  are quite  close.
IV.  Concluding  Remarks
Tests of producer  rationality  defined as
conformity  to the rules  of profit  maximi-
zation  (or a similar postulate)  for less-de-
veloped  countries  are  numerous.  How-
ever,  such tests for high-income  countries
are rare even though producer  rationality
has  been  questioned  in  such  countries.
These suggestions about lack of rationality
cannot be  simply  dismissed  as  not  merit-
ing serious  investigation.  One  such situa-
tion  relates  to  questions  concerning  the
degree  of  rationality  in  the  behavior  of
ranches  in the western U.S.  This study in-
vestigates  the  extent  of  rationality  ob-
served  in  the  production  behavior  of
ranchers  in  southeastern  Montana.  The
procedure  used  is that of Wise,  Yotopou-
los,  and  Nugent,  based  on  a  profit  maxi-
mizing production  model  in  which  input
and  product  prices and  a technology  pa-
rameter  are  allowed  to  vary  across  firms.
The  degree of rationality is judged by the
degree  of correlation  between  logarithms
of  the  inputs  of  labor  and  capital.  Al-
though the model is certainly  not perfect,
besides providing very simply an estimate
of  the index  of rationality,  it  lets  one  es-
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timate input supply  elasticities.  The data
used pertain to  69 ranchers and were  col-
lected by  personal  interviews.  The  input
supply  elasticities  do  not  seem  very  high
in some  cases,  thus justifying  to some  ex-
tent the  postulate of input  price variabil-
ity across firms. The degree of rationality,
as  judged  by  the  index  P,  being  of  the
order of 0.8 on a scale of 0-1 for the entire
sample, seems quite high, thus suggesting
reasonably  good  conformity  to  the  rules
of profit maximization.  Moreover,  the de-
gree  of  rationality  seems  fairly  uniform
across  the three size  groups (small,  medi-
um and large)  even though the  values of
P for the subsamples are somewhat lower
than  that for  the entire  group. Thus, one
might conclude  that the  evidence  is  con-
sistent  with  the  view  that profit  maximi-
zation  is  a  reasonably  good postulate  rel-
ative  to  the  behavior  of  ranchers  in  the
western  United States,  at least in the state
of Montana; and that various  policy mea-
sures  could,  at  least  tentatively,  proceed
on that basis.  Needless to say, such results
are  seldom  perfect  and  should  be inter-
preted  with  appropriate  caution  because
of  data  limitations,  difference  of opinion
regarding the assumptions underlying the
models, and the possible deficiencies  of the
procedures used.
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